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Credential stuffing and password spraying: layered defenses for your login

Compare credential stuffing, password spraying and brute force, then plan layered login defenses and appropriate MFA controls.

OOmnistu
Reviewed 2026-11-16 · 4 min read
MFA first
OWASP calls MFA by far the best defence against most password-related attacks; passkeys (FIDO2) make it attainable for most uses.
No MFA? Layer up
None of the alternatives matches MFA alone, but layers give reasonable protection - the source's words, and the bar to remember.
Plan to fail
Plan for any single defence failing; every defence should produce metrics, both detected and mitigated attack volume.

All wording checked against the OWASP Credential Stuffing Prevention Cheat Sheet linked in Sources.

Attackers do not always guess passwords for one account. OWASP's Credential Stuffing Prevention Cheat Sheet separates three attacks. We read it in full on 15 November 2026. We did not read the NIST and ASVS documents it references.

Attack What it is (OWASP)
Brute force Many passwords against a single account
Credential stuffing Username and password pairs from another site's breach
Password spraying One weak password against many accounts

OWASP says the defences are largely the same for all three.

Start with MFA

OWASP calls MFA by far the best defence against most password-related attacks, cites a Microsoft analysis (we did not read it and do not repeat its figure), and says passkeys (FIDO2) and other forms make MFA attainable for most uses. Risk-based prompting is one option for balancing usability and security, not a reason to weaken a mandatory MFA policy. Signals that can trigger additional checks include: new browser or device or IP; unusual country; an untrusted country or an IP on denylists or tied to proxy and VPN services; an IP that has tried many accounts; or scripted, bot-like volume. A "step-up" check can also guard high-risk actions such as large transactions or admin changes, and enterprise apps can allow-list trusted IP ranges. If you cannot require MFA for everyone, OWASP suggests requiring it for administrators. See our MFA article.

When MFA is not possible

OWASP says none of the alternatives matches MFA alone, but layers give reasonable protection. Its list:

Security questions

Do not use them as an extra challenge.

Secondary secret

Ask for all of it, not selected characters - and a second knowledge factor is not MFA.

CAPTCHA

Can slow automation but can be defeated by tools and services; watch solve rates for harm to real users.

Defence in depth and metrics

Plan for any single defence failing: client-side defences can be spoofed. Each defence should produce metrics, both detected and mitigated attack volume, filterable by IP, to reveal failures and unknown attacks. If different teams run different defences, coordinate changes.

Telling users

Warn about unusual events without flooding them. OWASP's example: do not notify about an ordinary wrong password, but do notify when a correct password was followed by a failed MFA check. If someone requests multiple resets from different devices or IPs, consider holding access pending further verification. Consider the user's email may also be compromised. Show details of recent logins (previous login time and place) and let users list and end active sessions.

Questions for your team

Limits

One OWASP page, read in full. It gives no thresholds, rates or numbers, and neither do we. Fingerprinting and IP intelligence raise privacy questions that need your own review. Tools it names (Sentry MBA, fingerprintjs2) were not examined.

By Omnistu.

Sources

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