OOmnistu

Blog / Engineering Playbooks

Engineering Playbooks

Multi-factor authentication options compared: what each one protects against

Compare MFA methods, phishing resistance, recovery risks and factor-change controls using OWASP's published guidance.

OOmnistu
Reviewed 2026-11-16 · 5 min read

OWASP's Multifactor Authentication Cheat Sheet explains what MFA is, when to require it and the strengths and weaknesses of each method. We read it on 15 November 2026 through its "something you do" section, and not the last sections or the NIST, passkey and other sheets it links. Everything attributed below is OWASP's, which in turn cites NIST SP 800-63B-4 in places.

What counts as MFA

Evidence from at least two distinct factors: something you know, something you have, something you are. Two things of the same factor, such as a password and a PIN, are not MFA and add little. Location and other risk signals can inform decisions but are not a factor. OWASP adds that many weaknesses it lists matter mainly against targeted attacks, and that any MFA is better than none.

Why bother

OWASP says the most common way accounts are compromised is weak, reused or stolen passwords, and that designers should assume passwords will be compromised. It calls MFA the best defence against most password attacks (brute force, credential stuffing, password spraying) and cites a Microsoft analysis; we do not repeat its figure here because we did not read that analysis.

Costs it lists: more complexity for admins and users, hardware cost, lockouts when a factor is lost, external dependencies that can fail or be vulnerable, and reset processes that attackers can abuse.

Quick recommendations

Require MFA for all users; offer TOTP; require it for admins and other privileged users; build a secure way to reset MFA; consider MFA as a service. How and when depends on the app's threat model, users and control over users.

When to ask for it

At login, and for sensitive actions: changing the password or security questions, changing the account email, disabling MFA, or elevating to an admin session. If there are several ways to sign in (a separate login API, a mobile app) each needs MFA or other protection; OWASP says these are often missed.

The methods

Method OWASP's main points
Password or PIN Simple, but weak and reused passwords, and phishable.
Security questions OWASP says NIST no longer recognises them as an acceptable factor. Answers are guessable or found on social media.
Hardware OTP token Hard to compromise remotely; costly and slow to replace; a stolen one works without a PIN; phishable though short-lived.
Software OTP (TOTP app) Cheap, standard, new app can be set up without shipping hardware. RFC 6238's default step is 30 seconds. Phone can be lost, compromised or be the same device used to sign in; backup seeds may be stored insecurely; phishable.
U2F / security keys Phishing-resistant through relying-party/origin binding when the protocol is verified correctly; cost, and easy to forget.
Client certificates Phishing-resistant, centrally revocable; need PKI, hard to install, can be stolen from a compromised machine.
Smart cards Unusable without the PIN; need PKI and third-party software in browsers.
SMS and phone calls NIST designates them restricted; OWASP says not to use for high-value or PII-handling apps. Risks: SIM swap, interception, preview on lock screen, message-cost abuse. If it is the only option, OWASP says to document the risk, rate limit per account, watch for SIM-swap signals and plan to move to TOTP, push or WebAuthn/FIDO2.
Email codes Easy, but only as strong as the email account, which often lacks MFA. OWASP notes debate over whether it is MFA.
Biometrics Can be convenient, but spoof resistance depends on the implementation; they need hardware, raise privacy concerns, and cannot be changed if compromised.
Location (IP, geolocation, geofence) A risk signal, not a factor. Bypassable with IPs in the trusted country; VPNs and relays reduce accuracy.
Behavioural signals Risk input, not a standalone factor.

Passkeys

OWASP says passkeys can give phishing-resistant MFA, but when used as MFA you must require user verification and check the verification flag on the server; a touch showing only presence is not a second factor. Its separate Passkey Security Cheat Sheet, which we did not read, covers the details.

One-time codes

For generated delivery codes, use short lifetime, single use, strict attempt limits, invalidate after success, no logging, no long-term plaintext. OWASP also recommends a secure random generator, considering 8 digits or more where usable, and replacing the old code on resend. It says hashing OTPs adds little against an attacker with the database (small keyspace), but still prevents accidental exposure through logs and limits the damage from brief database exposure.

TOTP is different from a generated delivery code: it requires a protected long-lived shared seed, which cannot simply be replaced by a hash. Store that seed encrypted with restricted key access; enforce replay and attempt controls.

Making it livable

Questions for your team

Related: forgot-password flows, session management basics, app authentication options.

Limits

One OWASP page, partly read. No pricing, adoption or effectiveness figures are given by us. Regulatory duties for MFA (the page mentions finance, healthcare and GDPR) vary and need counsel for your case.

By Omnistu.

Sources

Previous
Mass assignment: when a request sets fields it should not