The app that lets them watch you bank
RBI's BE(A)WARE booklet and Google Pay's own help page describe the same fraud: a helper who asks you to install a screen-sharing app, then watches your OTP arrive. The apps are legitimate tools - the fraud is who asked, and for what.
The refund has failed, says the caller, but he can fix it - he just needs to see the error on your screen. He asks you to install a small app and read out the code it shows. The app then asks for the permission that shares your screen; grant it, and while that session runs, whatever is on your screen - including an OTP that arrives during it - is on his screen too. The RBI's BE(A)WARE awareness booklet devotes a chapter to exactly this, and Google Pay's own help page names the same apps and the same outcome.
What the app hands over
The RBI booklet's modus operandi is three lines long: fraudsters trick the customer into downloading a screen-sharing app; through it they can watch and control the customer's phone or laptop and gain access to financial credentials; then they carry out unauthorised transfers or payments through the customer's internet banking or payment apps. Google Pay's help page lists what a fraudster can do with such an app open: control your phone to make transactions on your behalf, view your ATM or debit card details, and view the OTP sent to your phone and use it to move money. The app does not hack anything. You installed the window and opened it - and exactly what is visible through it depends on the permissions you granted and on any protections your phone or your apps apply during the session.
The apps are real; the reason is the fraud
Google Pay names Screen Share, AnyDesk and TeamViewer as examples - legitimate tools with genuine uses, which is exactly why the request sounds reasonable. The fraud is not the software but who asked and for what. Google Pay's own rule is categorical: it never asks you to download or install a third-party app for any reason, and if someone posing as its representative told you to install one, uninstall it immediately. The RBI booklet adds the discernment rules for the genuine cases: download such an app only when advised through the company's official toll-free number as published on its official website, never when an executive contacts you from a personal number; deactivate or log out of payment apps before the session; and remove the app as soon as the work is done.
The moment to stop
Every costume of this fraud - the failed refund, the KYC update, the cashback, the "support" from a marketplace - converges on the same request: install this app so I can help. That request is the tell. No refund, verification or prize needs a stranger watching your screen, and the OTP is the moment it pays off: with the app open, the code that was supposed to protect you is simply read aloud by your own screen. If you have already installed one at someone's instruction, uninstall it first, then call 1930, the national financial-fraud helpline, inform your bank through its official channel, and report at cybercrime.gov.in - prompt reporting can help the authorities intervene, but it does not assure prevention or recovery.
The shape worth remembering
A screen-sharing app turns help into surveillance. The RBI booklet's precautions for a genuine session narrow the risk rather than remove it: the call is yours, the number comes from the company's own website, payment apps stay logged out during, and the app is removed at the end.
Sources: the RBI BE(A)WARE booklet (hosted for customers; compiled by the RBI's Consumer Education and Protection Department from Ombudsman complaints, publication undated) for the modus operandi and the precautions, and Google Pay's help page on screen-sharing apps for what an open session exposes and its never-asks rule. Fraud reporting: 1930 and cybercrime.gov.in.
Frequently asked questions
AnyDesk and TeamViewer are on the official app stores. Are they unsafe?
The tools themselves are legitimate - Google Pay names them as examples of screen-sharing apps to close before payments, not as malware. The risk is the session: anyone on the other end can watch your screen, see card details and read your OTPs as they arrive. The RBI booklet's rule is about the circumstances: install only when the company's own published support channel advises it, keep payment apps logged out during, and remove the app afterwards.
He said he was from the app's own support team. How would I check?
By ending the call and using the company's official toll-free number as published on its official website - the RBI booklet's exact test. A genuine support team survives that redial; an "executive" who contacted you from a personal number and asks you to install software does not.
They watched one OTP and money left. What now?
Uninstall the app immediately, then call 1930, inform your bank through its official channel, and report at cybercrime.gov.in with the caller's number, the app name and the transaction references. Recovery is never assured, but prompt reporting can help the authorities intervene, so the call comes before everything else.